In order to truly address the problems af icting post-con ict countries
A legal order is a safeguard against the serious risk of criminalisation of the state. Corruption adds to fragility and undermines legitimacy. Abuse of state power destroys con dence, and ultimately the state's core purpose. Building the rule of law is also vital to public safetypoorly trained and paid police usually add to fragility by arming and empowering predators. In much of Afghanistan, the greatest security fear for businesspeople is kidnapping, often by the police. 12 Most recently, this entreaty was taken up by World Development Report 2011: Con ict, Security and Development (hereafter WDR "2011"), 13 which tackles the development challenges presented by FCSs. Building on the work of North, Wallis, and Weingast, and others, 14 the WDR 2011 highlights justice as one of three key areas (the others being security and jobs) on which donors should focus in order to build effective and sustainable transitions out of situations characterized by endemic con ict and fragility. 15 However, while legal, regulatory, and justice institutions are now seen as an important part of the solution to problems of con ict, fragility, and development, this recognition is not matched by a correspondingly clear sense of what should be done, how it should be done, by whom, in what order, or how success may be determined. Nor is this a new problem. The effort to forge theories and operational models on the role of justice initiatives in laying a path out of fragility must build on the experiences of the constituent  elds of con ict and development: the former, a  eld that has been the domain of those engaged in rule of law reform as a component of state building in countries emerging from con ict, 16 the latter the domain of actors concerned primarily with economic growth. Both  elds have struggled with a similar conundrum: on the one hand, there is a broad North-South, left-right consensus that justice, or rule of law, is key to achieving their respective goals; and on the other hand, a recognition that sure re ways of achieving rule of law remain elusive.
This chapter contributes to the discourse of justice (or rule of law) reform in FCSs in the following way: while other critiques have focused on extremely important failings of planning, technique, and execution (such as inadequate donor coordination, a lack of readily available and appropriately skilled international personnel, and excessively curtailed time horizons), 18 this chapter seeks to problematize the conceptual underpinnings of justice reform efforts. This chapter begins by exploring the conceptual bases and corresponding operationalization of the two dominant paradigms of justice reform-that of rule of law linked to state building, and that of justice reform linked to economic growth. Using the examples of Liberia and Afghanistan, the chapter examines the shortcomings of these models. It explores a lack of capacity, not in the traditional sense of technical expertise on the part of actors in countries, but on the part of donors to understand those countries and contexts in which they are working and to support processes that lead to sustainable change. The chapter seeks not to lessen or discount the vital importance and legitimacy of national policymakers but to problematize donor action, arguing that failings in justice programs can often be traced to the predilection of development actors to treat challenges requiring fundamental changes in people's attitudes, perceptions, values, and behavior (as governance and legal reform invariably does) as variants on technical problems that focus on-in Minister Tah's words-"super cial, humbug solutions." 19 The current convergence of the two  elds-state building and development-may present an opportunity to rethink conceptual underpinnings of justice reform efforts at the nexus of con ict and development, leading to more successful operational approaches. The latter part of the chapter explores the dynamic that may ensue from a convergence of these two  elds and offers ways to avoid mutual negative reinforcement of the two models that could result in "securitizing" 20 the approach of development actors, overemphasizing existential threats to development goals, and undermining broader considerations of the state-society compact on which the ef cacy of any institutional reform effort ultimately turns. 
The (In)capacity of Concepts and Models
The elevation of the rule of law to the status of a sine qua non for peace and development has occurred on two tracks that, although parallel, have remained largely discrete. One track emerged in the 1990s as the United Nations experienced an unprecedented demand for peace interventions, from Haiti to the Balkans, El Salvador to East Timor. As mission mandates took on ever more ambitious tasks of civilian administration, the justice components of those mandates quickly grew from police reform to reform of all components of the criminal and civil justice system. The fundamental importance of the rule of law to the project of post-con ict state building was set out by the secretary-general of the United Nations in 2004, in a document that embodies the paradigm that this chapter calls the "state-building" model. The document sets out a de nition of the rule of law that equates it with a political system with substantive content-a state that generates, promulgates, and is ruled by laws that ful ll certain technical and normative criteria:
[The rule of law] refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.
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The UNDP further de nes the primary modality of the rule of law in its clear nexus with security and recurrence of con ict: "Con icts may be caused by or result in the breakdown of law and order, or a collapse of state institutions. Preventive measures can be taken to help strengthen local capacity to prevent con ict occurring and to support the institutional structures that support dispute resolution and democratic governance. Strengthening the rule of law can be a critical tool for con ict prevention." 22 As a result, the UNDP takes a state-centric approach, placing national institutions at the center of its model: "the initial focus needs to be on building the capacity of national institutions and stakeholders to prevent and bring an end to violations, insecurity and impunity through their own capacity and resilience." 23 In this way, the rule of law, as a way of de ning and constraining state power and of containing and managing disputes, is linked to the aims and ends of state building: the rule of law is intrinsically tied to the construction of a functioning state and-through its ability to contain con ict-is part of the establishment of a monopoly over violence. Consequently, justice interventions in this paradigm focus primarily on strengthening the capacity of state law-and-order institutions while bringing substantive laws into compliance with international human rights standards.
The second dominant approach to rule of law reform began even earlier, with origins commonly attributed to the law and development movement of the 1960s and 1970s. This "economic development" paradigm seeks to enhance the quality of the legal underpinnings deemed necessary to support inclusive economic growth. Most commonly associated with the World Bank but broadly re ecting neoclassical economic orthodoxy, this approach stresses the importance to growth of legal concerns such as property rights, contract enforcement, and judicial predictability and ef ciency. This paradigm is distinct from the state-building one in terms of nomenclature: it uses the term "justice" to encapsulate a range of issues that would likely fall under the rubric of "rule of law reform" when considered by state-building actors. Its approach is also substantively distinct. While the Bank has long shared the United Nations' "belief that reconstructing countries devastated by warfare [is] an international responsibility," 24 it has consistently used a strictly economicrather than political-lens to examine the role of law and justice. According to Eugene Meyer, the  rst head of the World Bank:
(given the mandate and history of the Bank and the fact that its members are states-parties). 26 Functioning legal frameworks and institutions may be seen as developmental goods in themselves, allowing people to uphold and exercise their rights. 27 More important, in this paradigm, they are also instrumental in realizing a range of other development goals: without justice, people cannot easily receive or access public goods and basic services, nor can they effectively access a range of markets.
28
It is important to note that these two paradigms are, of course, stylized, and as such gloss over internal differences and pluralities among agencies and donors. There is both heuristic and narrative utility in boiling down the complex conceptual, political, and organizational underpinnings of these two broad approaches to justice reform as state building and economic development. Both the heuristic and narrative values can be seen in  gure 1, which forms part of the Capstone Doctrine of the United Nations' Department for Peacekeeping Operations. 29 The Capstone Doctrine, which was devised by the UN Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, is an attempt to outline the fundamental principles and core objectives of peacekeeping in response to new challenges, as a revamp of the General Guidelines on UN Peacekeeping issued in 1995. 30 It thus forms both a useful analytical tool and a narrative around which to structure interventions, and clearly shows the division that actors have seen between state building and economic development. 
Models
While the paradigms highlighted here may differ in terms of stylized philosophical underpinnings, there are distinct similarities in the models 32 used to apply those underpinnings to real-world situations. This section examines four ways that these paradigms are translated into operational models that exhibit similar features and suffer from similar  aws: state-centrism, organizational isomorphism, short time frames, and linear trajectories of change. This analysis draws on two key arguments made by Pritchett and Woolcock 33 regarding conceptual failures of development practice. First, that the goal of much of development is "to ensure that the provision of key services . . . is assured by effective, rules based, meritocratic, and politically accountable public agencies-that is, something resembling Weberian bureaucracies." 34 Second, that the problems associated with realizing this objective are compounded by "skipping straight to Weber"; that is, an "attempt to remedy problems of 'inadequate services' by calling upon a centralized bureaucracy to supply a top-down and uniform public service," providing "a technical (supply) solution . . . implemented by an impersonal, rules driven, provider." In doing so, development actors give short shrift to a key link in the implementation chain, namely, those ongoing, face-to-face "interactions between citizens, the state, and providers" that 31 Supra note 29, at 23.
32
We acknowledge those who would seek to limit the use of the word "model" and draw a keen distinction between it and "ideology. necessarily entail deep contextual knowledge, adaptive strategies, and engagement beyond institutional forms.
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State-Centrism
As established above, state-building and economic development practitioners generally place state institutions at the center of their justice reform work in FCSs (although the expressions of this can differ, with the former placing a greater emphasis on the monopoly over violence 36 and the latter engaging with aspects of institutions that support economic development and service delivery). 37 In general, there is good reason to support the tradition of political philosophy and policy that holds that state-backed formal institutions are a desirable means to a range of development ends, including security, political participation, and economic growth. 38 However, an exclusive focus on state institutions as the appropriate form promoting capable legal and regulatory institutions may miss the mark. In many FCSs, these institutions are either decimated or captured by political, criminal, or other interests, and may be inaccessible owing to economic, political, geographic, or linguistic factors. State institutions in such contexts characteristically lack infrastructure or institutional capacity, and can be remote, unaffordable, delayed, and seen as unfair, incomprehensible, and/or a foreign imposition, thus effectively denying legal protection to ordinary people. In many countries, customary systems operating outside the state regime are often the dominant form of regulation and site of dispute resolution. For example, in Sierra Leone about 85 percent of the population is predominantly governed by customary law; with a population of approximately 5 million people, the country had an estimated 125 legally trained personnel in 2003, 95 percent of whom were based in the capital, Freetown. 39 According to the Liberian minister of justice, in the aftermath of the ravaging civil war, [l] egal institutions barely functioned as many of the well educated and well trained citizens in law enforcement and the law  ed the country in the 1990s. The few who remained in the country tried to provide a semblance of law and order, but were often threatened into submission, leaving citizens very distrustful of the formal legal system. Corruption among judges and other public of cials became more prevalent than in the past, due to the fact that civil servants regularly received meager salaries several months in arrears. Ultimately, the formal justice system virtually collapsed and, consequently, most citizens (educated and uneducated) resorted to the informal justice system as a viable alternative. In a few instances, vigilante justice or mob violence prevailed.
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The existence of plural legal orders is not just a question of access; they may also be hotly contested political arenas with deep implications for the allocation of power, mechanisms of social accountability, governance structures, and the ethnic and ideological identity of the state. In Afghanistan, for example, efforts by the Kabul government to expand its reach to areas traditionally governed by nonstate justice systems-jirgas and shuras-have historically been met with hostile resistance that threatened state legitimacy and control. 41 In Liberia, while "progressive" voices call for the elimination of customary justice systems as a means of remedying the historical legacy of discrimination, many citizen users of customary justice consider the idea of a single (formal) justice system for all Liberians to be a further unwanted imposition of a Monrovia-based elite. 42 In such situations, external interventions that focus exclusively on state institutions are seen as-and indeed are-political choices with considerable consequences.
In recent years, the state-building approach has moved discursively to embrace the importance of nonstate justice systems. 43 The nature of this rhetorical engagement is, in its weaker form, disconnected; that is, nonstate justice systems are a "thing" to be engaged with, with strategies of engagement remaining ad hoc. In its stronger form, engagement is still underpinned by state-centrism; nonstate institutions are to be harmonized or embedded organizationally (through laws and structural reforms) and normatively (through the transmission and enforcement of human rights norms) into the state system. 44 Justice actors therefore focus on "entry points" for the transformation of such systems along a state-centric model. 45 This trend has been mirrored in the literature on economic development. Recognition of the importance of nonstate systems has been rhetorical (e.g., accounting for them discursively as "alternative dispute resolution" alongside 40 Azimi & Tah, supra note 1, at 8-9. other nonstate systems such as commercial arbitration). 46 In its more muscular state-centric form, the literature has pressed for harmonization and formalization as a means of providing economic goods: Hernando de Soto's call for the formalization of customary land rights as a means to develop an asset base for the poor can be seen in this light. 47 Unless the conceptual underpinnings of both justice paradigms shift away from state institutions as the answer, these trends will run into the same problems as their orthodox antecedents: an overemphasis on particular forms rather than on the actual functions they are meant to perform. Rather than starting with predetermined notions of the "right" institutional formulation, an alternative conception of an array of justice institutions starts with an analysis of the prevailing justice needs of citizens; the ways in which the various institutions mediate power, rights, and accountability; and the process through which such institutions can be made to deliver justice more fairly and effectively. As Minister Tah puts it, assume that every situation is "unique and idiosyncratic," "incredibly complex and nuanced." 48 
Organizational Isomorphism
The second key feature underpinning both paradigms is the presumption that inputs, incentives, and information deemed successful by experts in one context will work in the same way elsewhere; or, put differently, that a particular organization's functionality (what it does) is a product of its design (what it looks like), thereby justifying the transplanting of best practices (e.g., a given country's constitution or commercial code) from one context to another. This phenomenon follows closely from the  rst feature: the assumption of statecentrism is itself a form of isomorphism. Isomorphism further encompasses the limited engagement with social context on the part of donors and derives from stylized views of the relationship between individual and society. An alternative approach is rooted in the notion that institutions are instead intersubjectively constructed; that is, communities build shared understandings through social interaction of what an institution is, what it does, and how it should be assessed and (where necessary) improved. 49 For example, in the context of Liberia, legalized notions of human rights-such as the right to a fair trial-while important, may not "automatically assuage the concerns and distrust of a public that for so long has been alienated from the formal justice system" and that is looking for the meting out of justice.
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In FCSs, such isomorphism may render reform ineffectual; it may also lead to increased con ict. In Liberia, insistence on the best practice of prohibiting customary courts from handling serious crime has-in the absence of both suf- cient capacity and a shared sense of what constitutes justice-led to impunity and mob justice, and has undermined the legitimacy of the  edgling democratic state. 51 To take land and justice as an example, there is a broad 52 (albeit nuanced and critiqued) 53 literature on the value of formalizing land rights that is rooted in concepts of legal certainty and access to justice. However, competing claims can be extremely dif cult to regulate owing to the plurality of ways by which people conceive of land and land rights-for example, on a spectrum between communal and individual goods (indeed, for some disputants, it may be inconceivable that land be considered a good amenable to exchange). In a study regarding land privatization in Mongolia, a Mongolian pastoralist being interviewed regarding a murder in a  ght over a campsite re ected: "This land ownership is the worst possible thing for livestock husbandry. Cropland can be privatized and protected, OK. Livestock husbandry must certainly not be settled. The climatic conditions are extremely dif cult and changeable here. Therefore, pasture must be shared among herders and used in common . . . it must be left as it is and has been for hundreds of years." 54 
Short Time Frames
A related issue, stemming from the above point, is that reform is expected to take place within highly unrealistic time frames-three to  ve years being the limit of an electoral cycle and/or the (maximum) time a task manager may oversee a given project before moving on. 55 Imperatives to support projects meeting predetermined targets (such as the Millennium Development Goals) and to prioritize for support those projects that demonstrably work can mean 50 Azimi & Tah, supra note 1, at 9. rule of law projects face unwarranted expectations and, when they fail to meet them, suffer doubly when rival initiatives are lauded. As the WDR 2011 notes, attaining a one-standard deviation improvement in the rule of law (as measured by the World Bank's governance indicators) takes an average of 41 years in the 20 fastest reforming developing countries, let alone FCSs (where, in effect, the timescale for improvement is in nite, since their recent trajectory is inexorably downward). Such time frames are a daunting challenge not only to FCSs but also to donors and international agencies; embarking on crucial reforms whose realization, by their very nature, is likely to span multiple generations (let alone careers and budget cycles) suggests the need for an entirely different response framework.
Linear Trajectories of Change
A fourth problem, which characterizes the assessment of development projects more generally, is that change is presumed to take place along a linear trajectory, enabling relatively quick judgments to be made about project ef cacy now and into the future. 56 In terms of political and legal reform, institutions change along trajectories that are likely to be anything but linear 57 -a more realistic view would characterize such change processes as "step-functions" (or "punctuated equilibriums": long periods of stasis followed by abrupt transformation) or "J-curves" (wherein things get worse before they get better). If this is so, it makes evaluating institutional reform efforts highly problematic: without knowing where a given project lies in its trajectory, it is highly likely that a false diagnosis (i.e., inaccurately declaring failure or success) will be rendered. In a world where time frames are short, patience is thin, uncertainty is high, and trajectories are unknown (or even unknowable), however, institutional reform projects that can claim to deliver clear and predictable results in a short time will be highly favored, privileging the familiar tropes of best practice. Care must be taken to shift the incentives for "super cial, humbug solutions" that reinforce cycles of bad projects in favor of engaging with complexity and basing projects on "foundational diligence." 58 The cumulative upshot of these similarities is that both the state-building and the economic development approaches miss the interconnectedness of institutions and the social networks in which they are embedded. As a result, donor help is lopsided. 59 Fragile governments are called on to make complex and dif cult trade-offs within unrealistic time frames, generating in the process outcomes that are less than satisfactory and that, through failing in this way, delegitimize the very idea of reform, erode the likelihood that pro-reform coalitions will be sustained over time, and sti e long-run organizational innovation and indigenous learning, thereby undermining the very possibility of more effective reform in this domain.
Ideas for Experimentation
Thus far, this chapter has sketched out the dynamics of the gradual convergence of two distinct and powerful paradigms for development interventions-state building and economic development-that both reinforce and undermine the best and worst in each other. This convergence is new and unusual: in Kennedy's 60 and Kennedy's 61 genealogies of development, paradigms or consensuses have tended to collapse under critique in particular "moments" rather than to converge and assimilate or mutate. How such convergence might affect the supranational and national spaces for justice reform is anybody's guess; however, it is safe to assume that, as others have said in the context of the convergence of paradigms in education, it will result in "nontrivial changes in the structure, culture and organization" 62 of such reform in FCSs.
It might thus be possible to sketch out the following dynamic between evolving concepts in rule of law/justice reform in FCSs: there is a move by development actors to engage in space that has traditionally been the domain of those engaged in state building. This brings a development lens to the causes and consequences of con ict: for example, the need to resolve underlying disputes, such as those over land or labor, which might otherwise spill over into con ict. 63 This broadening has the potential to enrich justice reform in FCSs. However, development actors moving into this space are simultaneously engaging with those who take a state-building approach, which requires the ability to adopt a security lens, a lens that underscores the state monopoly over force. This can lead to initiatives that undermine local institutions that may be fundamental to containing the spread of violence and that focus on law, order, and the control of deviance, with less consideration of rights and entitlements-that is, "legitimate" grievances, and control and oversight over state power. 64 Broader questions of the state legal architecture-the nature of a rule of law state-and state/citizens relationships tend to be ignored. The  rst moves in this conceptual and policy reorientation are being made. We are starting to see a discursive engagement with nonstate justice at the policy level in the WDR 2011, 65 at the analytic level through the work of the Justice for the Poor program, 66 and at the operational level (discussions currently taking place around the next phase of the Afghanistan Justice Sector Reform Project envisage building links between state and nonstate institutions). 67 More broadly, emerging research on societal fragility 68 attempts to shift the locus of fragility from the state to society. It remains to be seen, however, whether such concepts will receive the fulsome embrace of reconceptualization or the minor recognition of marginal  xes at the institutional and/or operational level.
In the coming few years, donors will have to adapt to a new and rapidly changing conceptual terrain. They will have to acquire the capacity to react to changing concepts and to engage with the realities in the  eld. 69 Given the recondite, evolving, and dynamic nature of justice reform in FCSs, any prescriptions for donor policy or action are likely to prove unhelpful. This brave new world, however, will undoubtedly open up spaces for experimentation, 70 and actors will explore what works in this new space. In this spirit, let us conduct an early exploration of what this emerging space might look like through some modest sketches and brief suggestions that might support effective experimentation to underpin future efforts in this  eld, doing so through the lenses of analysis, operations, and policy.
The WDR 2011 is an appropriate frame for such efforts. The key  ndings of the WDR 2011 as regards justice in FCSs respond to the four problems with models outlined above:
• Exclusion of signi cant portions of the population (be that on the basis of ethnicity, religion, geography, etc.) from political voice, access to services, and economic opportunity establishes the conditions for triggering and 69 We do not seek to diminish the importance of national policymakers to effective reform, and we stress that the arguments advanced in this chapter are inspired by the insights afforded to us by national policymakers from Afghanistan and Liberia.
70 We also appreciate the cautionary note in Aldous Huxley's eponymous novel, which painted a picture of a world organized to be the antithesis of local experimentation. Just as Huxley wrote of dystopian human homogeneity and highly strati ed and rigid social structures and hierarchies, we, too, caution against the continued use by donors of presumptions of human homogeneity and of rigid human and social models: Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (HarperCollins 1998).
fueling con ict (requiring a response to state-centrism and organizational isomorphism).
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• Institutions, particularly nonstate institutions, that can mediate con ict and navigate and manage complex change are essential if societies are to emerge from cyclical con ict and endemic fragility (responding to state-centrism and, as a challenge to the idea of postcon ict transitional moments, responding to short time frames).
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• The state-society compact needs to be broadened over time so that political settlements have broad-based legitimacy, which is a foundational requirement for a functioning rule of law (responding to short time frames).
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• Developing institutional capability and legitimacy is an inherently uneven (responding to linear trajectories of change) but endogenous process (responding to organizational isomorphism) that is generational in timescale (responding to short time frames).
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Implications for Analysis
Minister Tah provides clear guidance from the perspective of the daily realities faced by policymakers in the  eld. She highlights the importance of going beyond state-centrism and taking a holistic approach to available justice institutions in FCSs, outlining the tension between the expectations placed by the people on the government as a resolver of grievances 75 and the social fact that most citizens turn (at least initially) to nonstate institutions in their quest for justice. 76 She also stresses that what we have termed organizational isomorphism ("a cookie cutter approach") 77 remains inadequate: the particularities of FCSs-in the case of Liberia, a country where a "persistent traumatized population [routinely encounters] weakness in capacity-building programs due to lack of foundational preparedness of trainees and, most importantly, a disintegrated value system" 78 -suggests that there needs to be an enhanced appreciation of the importance of context as the foundation for effective engagement. 76 "A public that for so long has been alienated from the formal justice system." Azimi & Tah, supra note 1, at 9.
77 Id., at 12.
78 Id., at 10.
• Psychology, noting Minister Tah's comments on psycho-social trauma 86 but also the ways in which perceptions of legitimacy, credibility, and effectiveness can vary among different actors, with serious consequences for the sustainability and ef cacy of reform efforts.
• Sociology, to provide, for example, insights into the patterns of normative "disintegration" during periods of societal transition, the dynamics of con ict that accompany these transitions as power oscillates between different groups, and understandings of the conditions under which different aspects of people's identities become politically salient.
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• Anthropology, to generate, for example, a closer understanding of, and provide explanatory force for, the social role played by "trial by ordeal."
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• Communications (including drama and performance), especially between groups who have very different ways of making and interpreting knowledge claims (such as illiterate villagers and social scientists).
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Implications for Operations
Donor interventions in Liberia expect "the justice system to function today as any other justice system in the region and, in some instances, on international standards, without regard to cultural diversity, limited resources or consideration of the abyss from which the country has ascended." 90 If this situation is to change, donors must avoid organizational isomorphism and the presumption of linear trajectories of change, instead developing an understanding of the situation in which they are intervening before designing operations. For example, they need to be sensitive to long-run time horizons and the tradeoffs that need to be made in the short term in order that a state-society compact might be built in the long term. Minster Tah's call provides an important framework for donor experimentation.
Operations need to be highly sensitive to the context of the situations in which they intervene. This is not a new observation. 91 However, this chapter's analysis of the two paradigms, coupled with Minister Tah's analysis, suggests three new ways to reconceptualize interventions:
• Levels of intervention: the limits of states in FCSs often (but not always 92 ) coupled to settings of deep legal pluralism, imply that operations should be decentralized (including engagement with legal pluralism) rather than privileging state-centrism.
• Type of intervention: the nature of interventions designed to strengthen the operation of justice systems and institutions, especially at the local level, might be broadened in two ways. First, they might be targeted at speci c issues underlying fragility at the social as well as the state level (e.g., to combat psycho-social trauma 93 among the Liberian population 94 ). Second, they might be designed to shift social norms and expectations, 95 particularly through communication and education strategies 96 targeted at the public (e.g., "public education as to evidentiary standards"), 97 avoiding organizational isomorphism.
• Modality of intervention: given the contexts in which they occur, interventions need to have long time horizons 98 and modest aims, particularly because they need to be sensitive to policy trade-offs, avoiding short time frames and linear trajectories of change. As a result, it might be useful to experiment with justice projects that seek to internalize norms in a particular social setting, that favor the provision of equitable spaces, or that support institutions engaging with a wide range of social fault-lines and fractures.
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Implications for Policy
Donors engaged in promoting justice in FCSs need to make context-sensitive policy. A  rst step in this direction could be to launch experimental programs that respond to the analytical and operational implications outlined in the preceding sections. Pilot programs and reports based on methodologies beyond the orthodox (historical analyses, for example) can provide an evidence base for effective, context-based policymaking that avoids state-centrism, organizational isomorphism, short time frames, and linear trajectories of change. For example, a donor might devise a strategy for engagement with nonstate systems, or might develop an holistic approach to avoid lopsided policy that supports one institution (such as the police) at the expense of the system as a whole.
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At the same time, however, donors need to ensure that counterparts in FCSs have the capacity to engage when determining policy and priorities. Afghanistan provides a cautionary tale. Chief Justice Azimi recounts that although the international community sought from us a list of our priorities, a plan for the future development of the judiciary and the priorities we wished to apply, we did not adequately express our needs. Up until only four years ago, we failed to specify what we needed, to set our priorities or to estimate the likely costs of those priorities. This led the international community to assume that everything was okay in the judiciary. Some simple donor-funded training programs were conducted from time to time, which seemed the best thing to be done; and donors were happy that these efforts were meeting our expectations.
101
Donors thus need to rethink their engagement with the state, incorporating or reemphasizing building the state's policy expertise into their policy development practices.
Conclusion
The default assumption in most development work is that weak implementation systems are in large part a function of capacity constraints on the part of line ministries in recipient countries, and that as such performance can be best improved by engaging in various concrete activities-training sessions, policy change, infrastructure provision, organizational reform-designed to strengthen the prevailing structures and upgrade the skills of the agents working within them. Moreover, in a world of development assistance in which skepticism is high, time horizons are short, and resources are stretched, highuncertainty issues such as enhancing justice in fragile and con ict-affected states generate multiple pressures for donors to show some form of shortterm accomplishment; all too often, these pressures are relieved by pointing to changes in institutional form (what institutions look like)-laws passed, courthouses built, reporting procedures altered-as opposed to function (what they actually do), and by justifying actions on the basis that experts elsewhere have deemed them a best practice. Some of this work has been successful, but the considered assessment of most rule of law reform efforts, whether undertaken in the name of state building or economic development, is that, at best, much remains to be learned.
So understood, capacity de cits are as much a problem for international agencies as for FCSs themselves, and improving the effectiveness of justice initiatives therefore requires revisiting the theories and corresponding practices that inform current approaches.
Justice reform is best understood as an adaptive rather than (primarily) technical problem, one that requires a sustained commitment to understanding the idiosyncrasies of the context(s) in order to more correctly identify binding constraint problems and possible solutions. With this in mind, donors should seek to improve their capacity to broaden the range of groups with whom they engage at the operational level, the methodological base on which key decisions are made, and their willingness and ability to engage with actors beyond the state-and the formal justice sector itself-in the larger task of enhancing the quality and accessibility of justice for all.
